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Abstract
The declining trust in the representative institutions of liberal democracy after the 2008 economic crisis has generated
a rise in appeals to substitute the representative model in favor of a participatory democracy. Although political repre-
sentation has been in crisis since its very inception, for the first time the new technologies of communication based in
the Web 2.0, smartphones and social media make replacing the elites’ intermediation in decision-making a real possi-
bility. Aiming to critically address this issue, the article uses a political theory framework to analyze the role of political
participation within the main models of democracy as a first step from where to question the viability and convenience of
participatory democracy nowadays. Then, the article focuses on the case of Podemos in Spain, a left-wing populist party
that advocates for instruments like referendums and citizen initiatives as a solution for the Spanish political crisis. Here,
the article highlights the shortcomings of Podemos’s participatory proposal, mainly focused on aggregating predetermined
positions instead of addressing the dynamics that undermine the quality of political debate. Finally, we conclude that deal-
ing with the citizens’ political disaffection requires institutional innovations designed to increase the deliberative quality
of our representative democracies.
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1. Introduction
The claim that representation is in crisis is certainly not a
new statement. Opinion studies since at least the 1970s
have been detecting a progressive decline in citizens’
trust in the institutions that uphold the liberal demo-
cratic model (Crozier, Huntington, & Watanuki, 1975;
Montero & Torcal, 2006; Pharr & Putnam, 2000). In this
regard, the economic crisis that started in 2008 has mag-
nified a pre-existing disaffection with the parties, gov-
ernments and parliaments inmostWestern democracies
(European Social Survey, 2013, p. 14; Latinobarómetro,
2018, pp. 34–43). Consequently, the consideration that
democracy is the best possible form of governance com-
pared to other alternatives has decreased significantly
in recent studies, especially among the youngest citizens
(Stefan & Mounk, 2016).
Like in previous crises, the current disaffection with
representative democracy is accompanied by voices cry-
ing out to replace this model with a participatory democ-
racy that grants greater influence to citizens in decision
making. In this regard, the prevailing zeitgeist is a furious
anti-elitism that denigrates any type of political interme-
diation as opposed to the popular sovereignty on which
true democracy is based. This phenomenon can partly
be explained by the combined effect of an increased self-
perception of political competence and the revolution of
communication technologies.
Increasingly more citizens perceive themselves as po-
litically competent, which leads them to judge the au-
thority of elites more critically and to seek unconven-
tional participation formulas (Matsusaka, 2005, p. 163).
In parallel, the widespread use of web-based technolo-
gies, smartphones and socialmediamakes it easier for in-
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dividuals and social groups to autonomously coordinate
in order to present their demands in the public sphere. In
cases as the Gezi Park protests in Turkey in 2013 or the
Arab Spring uprisings, digital technologies and especially
the social media have been a key resource in the demo-
cratic struggle against authoritarian regimes (Howard
& Hussain, 2011). In turn, a manifestation of the anti-
elitist trend in democratic countries is the symbolic im-
pact achieved in 2011 by the assembly-type protests of
Spain’s Indignados Movement, Occupy Wall Street in the
United States and Greece’s Syntagma SquareMovement.
Another example of this politicalmood is representatives
turning increasingly to referendums to resolve dilemmas
such as Scotland remaining in the United Kingdom in
2014 or Greece’s acceptance of the EU economic bailout
in 2015, to set out two recent cases. However, the unex-
pected outcome of the referendum on Brexit in 2016, or
the rise of xenophobic and populist parties in many Euro-
pean countries have challenged the cognitive and moral
virtues attributed to the citizenry as well as the trust on
new technologies as an agent of democratic progress.
Is participatory democracy a good idea? To answer
this question, we must first reflect on the normative
value attributed to participation within democratic the-
ory. Along with this, any alternative to liberal democracy
must rely on the best empirical data available on citi-
zens’ attitudes and abilities and, further, specify the sus-
tainability of its model under the structural conditions of
mass society. Aiming to critically address these matters,
this article first contextualises the debate on political par-
ticipation within the complex balance between the lib-
eral and democratic traditions that lay at the core of lib-
eral democracy, pointing out the theoretical and empir-
ical weaknesses that challenge the benefits attributed
to citizen participation. Thus, the article presents three
main shortcomings of the participatory model: its ten-
dency to offer a monistic legitimation of political partic-
ipation, the fallacy of the virtuous citizen, and its lack
of institutional precision. These flaws undermine the ap-
peal of participatory proposals as a solution to the demo-
cratic malaise.
From this theoretical framework, the article then
analyses the specific case of Podemos (We Can), a left-
wing populist party that presents several mechanisms of
direct democracy as a route to deal with institutional
disaffection in Spain. The interest of this study case is
twofold. At the Spanish level, the irruption of Podemos in
2014 has completely transformed a party system (imper-
fect bipartisanship) that remained unchanged since the
democratic restoration in 1977. Also, the discourse, pro-
posals and organizational style of this party—openly pop-
ulist according to the statements of itsmain leaders—has
fostered the change in the Spanish political culture ini-
tiated with the Indignados Movement in May 15, 2011
(Sampedro & Lobera, 2014). On the other hand, the case
of Podemos in Spain is representative of the left-wing
populist challenge to liberal democracy that, at present,
has similar manifestations in other European countries
such as France (La France Insoumise), Italy (Movimento
5 Stelle), Grece (Syriza) and Germany (Die Linke), among
others. Therefore, the shortcomings in Podemos’s par-
ticipatory model allow us to present a broader critique
to a certain type of democratic claims which ignore that
the real dichotomy is not between direct or representa-
tive democracy but between aggregative and delibera-
tive conceptions of democracy. Finally, the article con-
cludes that citizen participation in liberal democracies
should transcend the mere expression of predetermined
positions to focus instead on the deliberative quality of
the public sphere.
2. The Debate on Participatory Democracy
Evaluating the suitability of participatory democracy re-
quires that we first contextualise this model within a
broader discussion on the contemporary idea of democ-
racy. Thus, the first thing to point out is that liberal
democracy is the result of the union of two traditions—
liberal and democratic—that were initially opposed. The
liberal tradition, developed by enlightened figures such
as Locke, Montesquieu, Constant and Mill, assumes that
the best way to maximise collective happiness is to guar-
antee a private realm of autonomy that allows each indi-
vidual to defend its own life project against any arbitrary
meddling of power. On its part, democratic tradition
draws inspiration from the liberty of ancients (Constant,
1819), understood as the capacity of every citizen to prac-
tice self-governance via an equal participation in the rul-
ing of its community. This tradition lays at the core of
Rousseau’s republicanism, concerned about preventing
the private interests of a small elite from prevailing over
the common good. To secure self-rule, all citizens should
be active in decidingwhat is best for the community, that
is, in expressing the general will. Since sovereignty can-
not be represented, both the deputies and the govern-
ment are merely agents of the people’s will (Rousseau,
1996, pp. 510–513).
Therefore, the representative government born out
from the liberal revolutions of the late eighteenth cen-
tury is more liberal than democratic (Manin, 1997). Its
key institutions—Constitution, Rule of Law, separation
of powers—set a counterweight to majorities in order
to protect individual autonomy. On the other hand, the
main democratic feature in this model is participation
through electoral vote. Although the extension of suf-
frage since the late nineteenth century reinforces equal-
ity among citizens, political representation introduces
an elitist bias that separates the electoral body from its
deputies, which are entitled to ‘refine and expand’ public
opinion (Madison, Hamilton, & Jay, 1987).
Pointing out the normative tension inside liberal
democracy, the model of participatory democracy came
about in the 1960s and 1970s based on thinkers close
to the New Left, political ecology and social movements
like Pateman (1970), Macpherson (1977) and Barber
(1984). Highlighting Rousseau’s ideal of freedom as self-
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government, these authors argue that the asymmetries
in power and resources in liberal democracies refute the
formal consideration of individuals as free and equal
(Held, 2006, p. 210). Since political representation intro-
duces a clear imbalance in favour of liberal elitism, reviv-
ing democracy as ‘government of the people’ requires
implementing mechanisms for citizens’ direct involve-
ment in decisionmaking. The underlying idea here is that
only by practicing virtues in the public sphere it will be
possible to control the elite and achieve citizen excel-
lence in terms of political judgement and orientation to-
wards the common good (Pateman, 1970). Thus, among
the benefits attributed to participation, two of them be-
comeessential: first, participation develops the cognitive
skills needed to attain a competent political judgement;
second, the involvement in public affairs favours respect,
empathy and solidarity, which are necessary for putting
the common good before individual interests.
Despite sharing many values with the classic Athe-
nian democracy, participatory democrats as Pateman
and Macpherson move away from orthodox Marxism to
question the viability of direct democracy as a complete
alternative to representative democracy. Instead, they
claim that the state must be democratized by extend-
ing citizen participation to the key dimensions in which
most people spend their lives, such as the workplaces
and the local level, but also to political parties, parlia-
ments and state bureaucracies (Held, 2006, pp. 211–213;
Pateman, 1970, p. 104). Here, it is possible to identify
contemporary mechanisms that help to promote these
ambitious goals: referendums, popular initiatives and
town hall meetings are among the main resources for
the citizens’ direct involvement in our days (Matsusaka,
2005, p. 158). The common point in all of them is that
citizens can bypass representatives and participate di-
rectly in drafting bills and voting on substantive politi-
cal decisions. Specially, referendums and popular initia-
tives play a prominent role in countries like Switzerland
and Italy, as well as in the American state of California
(Budge, 1996, pp. 89–104). Also, the participatory model
has inspired a wide range of experiences at the local
level, with formulas like participatory budgeting, advi-
sory councils and municipal consultations, to mention
just a few examples.
However, the high normativity of this model makes
it difficult to critically assess its viability under the
less than ideal conditions of mass society (Held, 2006,
pp. 214–216). In this regard, the debate between propo-
nents and opponents of participatory democracy tend to
confusingly mix theoretical-normative type arguments
with others that are empirical-descriptive (Haller, 2017,
p. 57). Concretely, participatory democracy faces three
core problems: the tendency to offer a monistic legiti-
mation of participation, the fallacy of the virtuous citi-
zen and a lack of institutional precision. Let’s take a look
at them.
Firstly, we must reflect on the political legitimacy at-
tributed to participation. The participatory ideal can be
self-referential if, following Arendt (1958), we state that
the citizen’s mere capacity to express a political stance
who affects the collective decision represents an intrinsic
value regardless of its practical consequences (expressive
justification). However, an instrumental legitimation can
also be considered, via which participation would be de-
sirable due to the benefits it provides, either generating
empathetic citizens who are interested in the common
good (educational justification); or providing an ideal
method for reaching the best decisions inmoral and tech-
nical terms (epistemic justification). Here, advocates of
participatory democracy tend to omit the diversity of val-
ues associated with participation, ignoring empirical ev-
idence that shows that the expressive, educational and
epistemic values are extremely difficult to make compat-
ible with each other inmost of participatory experiences,
which thus requires to sacrifice the monistic approach in
order to set priorities among them. It would be unsus-
tainable to state that the expressive value of participa-
tion justifies poor economic and social results. Also, em-
phasising its educational value involves recognising that
citizens have previous civic shortcomings, which raises
doubts about the epistemic quality of proposals that—
like referendums—are based on themere aggregation of
their opinions.
Secondly, accrued empirical research challenges
the ideal of the well informed, empathetic and tol-
erant individual on which the participatory model is
based. Studies in recent decades repeatedly point out
that a significant percentage of individuals have in-
consistent opinions on substantial topics and do not
know even basic details about their political systems
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1980;	Converse,
1964; Shapiro, 1998;	Somin,	2010; Zaller, 1992). The en-
durance of this phenomenon would confirm the theo-
ries of Schumpeter, who attribute lay citizens’ political
ignorance to a rational calculation of utility: in modern
societies, individuals perceive political affairs as some-
what distant from their daily experiences and as compet-
ing with other demands in their private lives. This is the
reason why they devote less attention and responsibil-
ity to them than other issues, reaching to poorly consid-
ered judgements (Schumpeter, 1976, pp. 259–264). Al-
though the lack of substantive knowledge about many
subjects could be compensated for with ‘cognitive short-
cuts’ (Lupia & McCubbins, 1998), the fact is that the util-
ity of these heuristics depends on the individuals’ skills
to verify their reliability, what constitutes a circular ar-
gument (Hoffman, 1998). Moreover, the plummeting of
information costs linked to new technologies has been
achieved at the cost of introducing such a vast diversity
of sources that they end up creating greater confusion,
also making it possible to find information suitable for
confirming any pre-existing biases that individuals want
to keep (Rosenberg, 2007).
On the other hand, advocates of the participa-
tory model argue that representation undermines cit-
izens’ wishes to be involved more frequently in poli-
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tics, as shown by their support to referendums and
popular initiatives in the majority of surveys con-
ducted in democratic countries (Bowler, Donovan, &
Karp, 2007, pp. 351–352; Donovan & Karp, 2006,
pp. 673–674). Nonetheless, specific studies on this mat-
ter reveal a more complex reality. The research of
Hibbing	and	Theiss-Morse in the United States, dupli-
cated in several European countries, found that along
with a significant number of citizens who want to partic-
ipate, there are also many people who would prefer in-
stead an increase in the technical andmoral skills of their
representatives (Bengtsson & Christensen, 2014; Font,
Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
2002; Webb, 2013). In this sense, behind the disaffected
citizens there would not always be a greater desire to
participate, but instead frustration about the poor func-
tioning of political representation which leads them to
support any alternative that promises more control over
governing elites (Bowler et al., 2007, p. 360).
In linewith Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), data re-
veal that—beyond electoral participation—the actual in-
volvement in initiatives such as protests, political rallies,
referendums and the like tend to be limited and unequal
(Budge, 1996, pp. 14, 95–96). This seems to indicate that
both the attitudes towards citizen participation and the
preference for a specific model of democracy depend on
where individuals standwith regards to sociodemograph-
ics, education and ideology (Donovan& Karp, 2006; Font,
Galais, Wojcieszak, & Alarcón, 2014). For this reason, di-
rect democracy mechanisms such as referendums, popu-
lar initiatives, town hall meetings and participatory bud-
geting have the risk of over-representing the viewpoints
of active individuals, thus ignoring a majority of popula-
tion who does not take part in these processes (Ganuza
& Francés, 2012). Along with this, the homogeneity of
participants creates dynamics of ‘groupthink’ that end
up generating cognitive biases andmore radicalised posi-
tions than the original ones (Sunstein, 2002). As a result,
a participation that does not represent the overall popu-
lation ends up damaging the epistemic and educational
quality of these mechanisms even on moral issues that,
in principle, would not require expert knowledge.
Finally, the demand for more participation conflicts
with the structural conditions of contemporary democ-
racy, characterised by a large demos, division of labour
and individuals’ lack of time (Dahl, 1989; Dahl & Tufte,
1973). In this context, suggesting that all citizens should
spend a substantial part of their lives studying informa-
tion, debating andmaking decisions would entail putting
participation above other important areas of modern
life as family, leisure or work. This is why the relation-
ship between representation and participation is bet-
ter understood as a matter of degree and not as a di-
chotomy. From this stance, it would be about deter-
mining whether mechanisms like referendums and pop-
ular initiatives should serve as an occasional comple-
ment to representation or, conversely, should entail the
core of decision making (Budge, 1996, pp. 43–46). How-
ever, many proposals for participatory democracy are
not clear in this respect, so that many disputes around
this model arise due to misunderstandings caused by its
lack of institutional specificity (Held, 2006, pp. 214–216).
Moreover, although many Western constitutions recog-
nize some mechanisms of direct democracy and cases
like Switzerland or California prove that referendums and
citizen initiatives are a viable option in terms of time and
effort, problems of ignorance and unequal participatory
attitudes still have no cogent response.
Nevertheless, there is another democratic model
that can fare better concerning inclusion, equality and
epistemic quality. Emerged at the end of the last century,
deliberative democracy grounds the self-government in
the popularwill generated after a collective reasoning be-
tween free and equal citizens (Cohen, 1989; Habermas,
1994; Held, 2006). When people deliberate, ‘they care-
fully examine a problem and arrive at a well-reasoned
solution after a period of inclusive, respectful consider-
ation of diverse points of view’ (Gastil & Richards, 2013,
p. 255). The deliberative citizen does not get involved in
the political process to enforce given judgments and pref-
erences, but to reevaluate his positions from the view-
point of the common good and in the light of new argu-
ments and better information (Manin, 1987).
In this sense, citizen juries, consensus conferences or
deliberative polls are good examples of deliberativemini-
publics, that is, ‘groups small enough to be genuinely
deliberative, and representative enough to be genuinely
democratic’ (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006, p. 220). What dis-
tinguishes them from other participatory mechanisms is
that they are focused on generating optimal conditions
for an informed deliberation in small groups of lay citi-
zens (for a detailed account see Gastil & Levine, 2005).
Thus, for example, a Citizen Jury gathers a small group
of citizens to debate face-to-face for several days on a
specific topic with backgroundmaterials and in-depth in-
formation. After deliberating and receiving further clari-
fications from a panel of experts, the participants reach
a conclusion that is sent to public authorities (Smith &
Wales, 2000). On the other hand, a Deliberative Poll se-
lects a larger sample of citizens (often over a hundred)
who take a survey both at the beginning and at the end
of the process to check to what extent their opinions
on the issue at stake changed as a result of in-depth
discussion with rigorous information and expert clari-
fications (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Unlike other partici-
patory designs, deliberative polls look for the sociode-
mographic representativeness of the sample of citizens
what, in turn, guarantees a plurality of viewpoints and
avoids the problems of cognitive bias and group polariza-
tion. In addition, representativeness legitimizes the pro-
cess’s outcome, since it constitutes the reflective judge-
ment reached by a miniature recreation of the popula-
tion. Furthermore, it does so without asking for an unre-
alistic involvement of all citizens.
To sum up, in the less than ideal context described by
the empirical research, the expressive value of participa-
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tion can end up contradicting its supposed educational
virtues and, above all, the efficiency required in making
decisions. For this reason, those who prioritise epistemic
considerations reject the high levels of citizen involve-
ment in the participatory model, since it could lead to
short-term and sectarian measures that are unable to
evaluate the complexity of the issues at stake (Sartori,
1987, pp. 116–120). Deliberative minipublics as citizen
juries or deliberative polls offer a cogent alternative to
these weaknesses but advocates of participatory democ-
racy tend to set aside these mechanisms in favor of ref-
erendums and other non-deliberative formulas. By focus-
ing on the expressive value of participation as the sole or
main moral justification, these proposals can end up pro-
ducing dynamics far from the epistemic and civic bene-
fits they presume will occur. Some recent cases highlight
these risks: assembly type protests dominated by ‘group-
think’ that only recognise those who share radical postu-
lates as ‘the people’ (Marangudakis, 2016, p. 791); ref-
erendums characterised by serious informational imbal-
ances or false information, or where the initial question
has been distorted (Gastil & Richards, 2013, pp. 262–263;
Haller, 2017, pp. 67, 70–71). The next section analyses
the case of Podemos, the party that has hoisted the flag
of citizen participation in Spain.
3. From Theory to Practice of Participation: The Case
of Podemos
The emergence of Podemos (We Can) in Spanish politics
is closely connected to the protests of the Indignados
Movement on May 15, 2011, the moment in which
the effects of the economic crisis that started in 2008
were strongly felt in the country. The squares filling
with thousands of demonstrators to the cry of ‘They
don’t represent us!’ and ‘Real democracy now!’ pro-
jected an egalitarian image of politics based on open as-
semblies, transparency and direct democracy (Díaz-Parra
& Jover-Báez, 2016, p. 685; Kioupkiolis, 2016, p. 101;
Maeckelbergh, 2012, p. 208). Thus, after the European
elections in May 2014, Podemos appeared as the politi-
cal force that wanted to institutionally channel the cul-
tural change symbolised by the indignados (outraged).
Consistent with the critical claims of 15-M, this party
argued that the Spanish economic and institutional cri-
sis was not only due to the poor management of the
traditional parties—PP (People’s Party, centre-right) and
PSOE (Spanish Workers Socialist Party, centre-left)—but
also to the lack of a genuine democracy. In Podemos’s
populist discourse, the crisis was used as an excuse by
the neoliberal elite to undermine the institutions that
allowed the people’s sovereignty. Therefore, Spanish
politics—claimed Podemos—was better understood by
pitting the ‘people’ against a ‘political caste’ than relying
on the traditional right and left division.
Assuming the anti-elitist framework of participatory
democracy, Podemos centres its political proposal on the
need for new forms of citizen involvement aimed at re-
generating public life and regaining the institutions for
the people (Podemos, 2014, p. 6, 2017a, pp. 4–6). Thus,
instruments like referendums, consultations and popular
initiatives are recurrent features in Podemos’s project. In
short, Podemos’s participatory ‘medicine’ is manifested
via three broad areas: its internal organisation, its elec-
toral programme and its participatory formulas at the lo-
cal level. In all them, an innovative use of digital technolo-
gies helps this party to reduce the costs of engaging in
political activities such as debating or voting.
With regards to internal organisation, Podemos fits
within the category of ‘ciber parties’ which ‘use web-
based technologies to strengthen the relationship be-
tween voters and party’ and also offer voters and sup-
porters rights traditionally associated with formal mem-
bership (Margetts, 2006, p. 531). The intensive use of dig-
ital technologies sets Podemos substantially apart from
all other Spanish parties, by ensuring that its support-
ers can participate in the party’s organic life at a low
cost in terms of time and effort. Podemos blurs the tra-
ditional political militancy by letting anybody registered
on itswebsite—515,304 citizens as by February 5, 2019—
to participate in the party’s internal decisions as a full-
right member, which encompass everything from elect-
ing the party leaders and institutional candidates in open
primaries to drafting the electoral programme through
processes that alternate face-to-face debateswith online
discussions and voting. Podemos’s online debating plat-
form is Plaza Podemos 2.0 (Podemos Square 2.0). Evolv-
ing from the original platformReddit, it uses the free soft-
ware Consul developed by the Madrid City Council. In
this platform, the proposals that reach a 10% of support
from the total census qualify for a referendum among
the party’s registered members (Plaza Podemos, n.d.-a).
Podemos also incorporates binding consultations
about sensitivematters—either raised by the party elites
or by a given number of registered members—such as
the policy on pacts and electoral alliances, or the removal
of the party’s leaders and public offices (Mikola, 2017;
Podemos, 2017b, art. 14, 2017c, p. 5). There is another
online platform to vote on these consultations and in the
internal primaries (https://participa.podemos.info/es).
Podemos uses the Agora Voting technology, a web plat-
form that provides services of safe online voting to pub-
lic administrations, political parties and other civil soci-
ety organizations. Voting requires a computer or other
digital devices—like smartphones or tablets—connected
to internet. It is also necessary to have a cell phone to
receive a security code before casting the vote. Thus,
for example, 107,488 people out of the 250,000	reg-
istered participated in the final vote on the party’s
founding principles, held in October 2014, while in the
Second Podemos’s Citizen Assembly, held in February
2017,	155,190 people voted out of the 450,072 regis-
tered (Alameda, Galán, & Abad, 2018).
However, Podemos’s online participation manifests
some flaws. In the first place, the digital divide—linked
to age, education and income—generates differences be-
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tween those able to participate via digital technologies
and those unable to do it. Trying to balance this gap,
Podemos presents its círculos (circles) as a space for face-
to-face debating and voting. However, there is still an
imbalance in favor of online participation. Thus, for ex-
ample, in the 2018 primaries to elect Podemos’s candi-
dates for the local elections of 2019, the party rules es-
tablished that in-person voting was only mandatory in
municipalities with less than 50,000 inhabitants, while
telematic voting would be the normal method in bigger
cities (Podemos, 2018, pp. 7–8). To compensate for the
digital divide in those cities, Podemos’s rules only encour-
age the people in the territories where internal elections
are held ‘to put polling stations at street level or indoors’.
Even in these cases, in-person voting should use telem-
atic means instead of traditional paper ballots (Podemos,
2018, p. 20). In the second place, online voting systems
are based on a complex software, which makes difficult
for an average citizen to understand and check the key
steps of the process. Hence, the trust on the process
and its outcomes is undermined. In addition, apps like
Appgree—initially used by Podemos to simplify debates
and voting procedures—can store sensitive data about
users. These dilemmas often go unnoticed due to the
widespread technological enthusiasm.
Leaving aside the internal organization, Podemos pro-
poses extending its organizational practices to the Span-
ish political system. To do so, its electoral programme,
crafted via participatorymeans for the 2015 general elec-
tions, incorporates a wide range of measures aimed at
strengthening citizen participation and controlling the
elite. Along this line, it proposes institutionalising revo-
catory referendums to remove governments that have
incurred a ‘clear and substantial’ noncompliance with its
electoral programme, as well as the public offices ‘in spe-
cific situations involving loss of legitimacy’. In parallel, it
suggests to ease the procedures for popular legislative
initiatives, as well as fostering new types of citizen ini-
tiatives, including those aimed at vetoing regulations ap-
proved by representatives that are considered detrimen-
tal (Podemos, 2015, measures 225 and 226). Also, the
‘right to decide’ includes ‘the call for a referendum with
guarantees in Catalonia so that its citizens can decide on
the type of territorial relationship they want to establish
with the rest of Spain’ (Podemos, 2015, measure 277).
In general, Podemos’s programme makes referendums
a regular procedure for taking decisions in areas as di-
verse as culture, education, public works or foreign pol-
icy, among many others.
Finally, local politics represents an ideal arena to
show the virtues of Podemos’s participatorymodel. Thus,
after the municipal elections in 2015, cities like Madrid,
Barcelona and Valencia—inwhich Podemos is part of the
governing coalition—have implemented ambitious poli-
cies for citizen participation based on digital technolo-
gies, especially with regards to participatory budgeting
and citizen consultations. In Madrid, for example, all reg-
istered residents can freely pose their expenditure pro-
posals within the annual participatory budget, which go
through successive stages of collecting endorsements
from other citizens, an evaluation of cost and technical
viability by the pertinent municipal department and, fi-
nally, an open vote—in-person or online—for those of
legal age 16 and older registered in the municipality
(Madrid City Council, n.d.). Again, replicating Podemos’s
organizational model, digital technologies play a key role
in the stages of proposal, endorsement and final voting.
Similarly, citizen consultations allow those at least 16
years old to vote electronically to decide on matters sub-
mitted for consideration by the city council or by citizens
themselves in the municipal website for citizen partici-
pation (https://decide.madrid.es) after achieving the en-
dorsement of at least 1% of the local census. Thus, the
first consultations took place in 2017 and were focused
on topics related to remodelling public spaces, transport
and urban facilities (Madrid City Council, n.d.).
At this point, the critical analysis of Podemos’s pro-
posals makes the contrast clear between the theory and
practice of participatory democracy. The first thing that
draws our attention is the great importance given to
the direct aggregation of citizens’ preferences, as com-
pared to the lack of concern about the quality of the
debate that should illustrate these positions. For exam-
ple, in the case of the consultations organised by the
Madrid City Council in 2017, 94% of participants voted in
favour of ‘integrating public transport in a single ticket’,
while 89% voted for the proposal of ‘making Madrid
100% sustainable’ (Madrid City Council, n.d.). This result
was to be expected, if we bear in mind that the propos-
als never detailed the costs or possible negative conse-
quences of these decisions and there was no public de-
bate about other alternatives (Pérez Colomé & Llaneras,
2017). Nothing in the logic of these consultations guar-
antees that the final decision will be the outcome of
a reflective debate with an exchange of diverse argu-
ments and the best information available (Rico Motos,
2019, p. 176).
Further, the issue, date and terms of the consultation
are strategic decisions in the hands of those who plan
the referendum, which can favour a specific result in ad-
vance, ormake participants end up responding to a differ-
ent issue than that which is apparently formulated. That
was the case of the internal consultation called by Pablo
Iglesias and Irene Montero, both prominent leaders of
Podemos, to face the criticism caused by their purchase
of a luxurious villa outside Madrid. Due to the literal
wording of the question—not addressing the purchase
but the continuity of Iglesias and Montero at the fore-
front of the party—those registered in Podemos were
forced to consider the party’s stability above any moral
judgement about the possible incoherence between the
lifestyles of both leaders and their anti-elitist rhetoric
(Marcos, 2018). In addition, practically all the consulta-
tions posed by Podemos have ended with percentages
close to 80% of support to the option defended by the
party elitewho raised the consult, whichwarns about the
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plebiscitary tendency of thismechanism (Plaza Podemos,
n.d.-b).
Goingmore in depth on Podemos’s internal activities,
despite the low costs in terms of time and effort involved
in online voting, participation of those registered in the
primaries and internal consultations has never surpassed
the 43% obtained in October 2014, with the approval of
the party’s initial rules, and even dropped by 4% in voting
for the 2015 electoral programme or by 9.7% for electing
the party candidates to the 2019 European elections. At
best, the most successful participation percentages are
some 38% of active registered members (Alameda et al.,
2018; Piña, 2018). These data question the claimof a gen-
eral desire for political involvement, even among the sup-
porters of a party that defends participatory democracy.
Moving the focus towards local politics, the low par-
ticipation in Madrid’s 2017 consultations highlights the
problem of the actual representativeness of these expe-
riences. By posing representation and participation as
dichotomous alternatives, Podemos omits that referen-
dums, participatory budgeting and open assemblies are
an indirect type of representation, in so far as the citi-
zens who take part in them become de facto represen-
tatives of those absent (Rico Motos, 2019, pp. 174–175).
Thus, in consultations on reforming Gran Vía and Plaza
de España—two iconic areas in the centre of Madrid—
only 8% of the municipal census voted, so that the re-
modelling of these spaces was decided by a small per-
centage of participants, replacing a local corporation that
represented the 68% of Madrid residents who voted in
the 2015 municipal elections (Pérez Colomé & Llaneras,
2017). Further, since the citizens who get involved in
these mechanisms tend to share an ideological and so-
ciodemographic profile, bias problems arise that could
explain—for example—the controversial result of an-
other consultation, in which the favourable vote of 2,528
residents out of 176,000 people registered in the district
(1.7% of the census) ended up removing the name of
king Felipe VI, Head of State, from the park in this dis-
trict. As we explained previously, these biases can be
addressed by statistically representing the plurality of
population and securing in-depth debates in a respect-
ful environment, as it is the case in deliberative polls.
However, this participatory mechanism is marginal in
Podemos’s proposal.
Finally, Podemos’s project manifests the lack of in-
stitutional definition that is often associated to the
participatory model. Despite its mythification of direct
democracy, no political document of the party openly
poses a complete alternative to representative democ-
racy, but instead advocates an imprecise mix of repre-
sentative institutions and direct mechanisms that cause
conceptual confusions such as proposing at the same
time a ‘real, representative, egalitarian and participatory
democracy’ (Iglesias, 2015). Instead of clarifying the re-
spective role of participation and representation in a
non-dichotomous proposal, Podemos seems to prefer a
discursive ambiguity around its claim for participatory
democracy, since it allows this party to circumvent the
model’s practical problems.
However, when delving deeper into Podemos’s or-
ganisational model—presented as a reference for Span-
ish politics—we find that the participatory rhetoric con-
flicts with a vertical and centralised organisational reality,
based on the hyper-leadership of the general secretary
(Díaz-Parra & Jover-Báez, 2016, p. 690; Kioupkiolis, 2016,
pp. 111–113). Although online primaries are potentially
more inclusive than offline ballots, the specific design
of the voting procedure becomes a key factor, since it
can also ‘strengthen the party leadership vis-à-vis the
party intermediary elites and thus foster anti-democratic
tendencies’ (Mikola, 2017, p. 39). That seems to be the
case of the controversial voting procedure in the 2015
Podemos’s primaries, which adopted a system of closed
lists and the possibility of approving a whole list with-
out expressing any individual preference. In this sense
‘only three of the 65 selected candidates following Pablo
Iglesias were not identical to the ones on his list’, which
underscores the party leader’s dominance of the candi-
date selection process (Mikola, 2017, pp. 44–45).
Moreover, Podemos’s internal documents recognize
the abandonment of its ‘circles’, the assembly partici-
pation mechanism that was called upon to become
the ‘guarantee for the control and critical evaluation
of Podemos’s representative bodies and public offices’
(Podemos, 2017a, pp. 11, 48). Once again, the anti-elite
rhetoric clashes with the structural imperatives in any
complex organisation, which is obliged to become bu-
reaucratic and delegate functions to an elite in exchange
for efficiency (Michels, 1959). Thus, while Podemos has
implemented an innovative system of internal participa-
tion, the online consultations—and, to a lesser extent,
the primaries—often end up as a complement to the
leadership of party elites or, at worst, as a strategic re-
source at their hands. From a ‘movement party’ close to
social movements Podemos has evolved towards a more
hierarchical structure (Della Porta, Fernández, Kouki, &
Mosca, 2017).
In summary, relying on an idealised vision of citizen
participation by which any decision that arises from the
popular will is intrinsically virtuous, Podemos turns to ei-
ther a self-referential justification of participation regard-
less of its concrete results, or the monistic fallacy that
upholds that referendums, open assemblies and citizen
initiatives are capable of simultaneously maximising the
expressive, educational and epistemic values of partici-
pation. The analysis of the participatory formulas imple-
mented by this party shows that the reality of participa-
tion is more complex than the ideal picture projected in
Podemos’s discourse.
4. Participation: Aggregative or Deliberative?
The irruption of Podemos in Spanish politics is framed
within a generalised wave of disaffection that—
especially after 2008—blames elites and liberal demo-
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cratic institutions for the lack of effective response to
the uncertainties generated by globalisation. In parallel,
the case of Podemos also illustrates the contradictions
of participatory democracy, which calls for citizen em-
powerment without offering a viable alternative to rep-
resentative democracy (Kioupkiolis, 2016, p. 106). Thus,
the leaders of Podemos do not translate their participa-
tory claim into a concrete institutional design capable of
materializing the expressive, educational and epistemic
values associated to political participation.
Participatory democrats could argue that the criti-
cisms of citizens’ abilities raised to reject direct democ-
racy could be extended to challenge democracy itself
(Budge, 1996, p. 66): if individuals are ignorant and
sectarian, why let them participate in the selection of
their representatives? Here, the fact that representative
democracy coexists with high levels of ignorance and sec-
tarianism highlights the core problem: an aggregative vi-
sion of democracy that discards the importance of pub-
lic deliberation. From this viewpoint, ‘it is no improve-
ment that the mass of citizens, rather than select elites,
should be the ones tomake ill-considered choices in a dis-
respectful civic climate’ (Gastil & Richards, 2013, p. 256).
Faced with this situation, the deliberative model
states that truly significant participation is that which
includes interaction with other points of view in shap-
ing individual political judgements and, at times, chang-
ing preferences as a result of public debate (Habermas,
1996). Thus, the real boundary is not between direct or
representative democracy, but that which distinguishes
aggregation from deliberation. Representation and par-
ticipation are not necessarily dichotomic ideas but any
balance between them should be evaluated through the
lens of the deliberative quality of the political system. It is
not only aboutmaking better information available to cit-
izens, but about creating the conditions so that they care
about taking part in inclusive debates endowedwith due
epistemic conditions.
If citizen participation is to move beyond merely ex-
pressing predetermined positions,Western democracies
must paymore attention to the quality of debates within
the partial public spheres arisen from the technological
revolution. Nowadays, the democratisation of communi-
cation via Web 2.0, smartphones and social media sup-
ports the democratic struggle against hierarchical elites
but, on the other hand, it can also generate a loss of
control over the truthfulness of the information on the
web. In terrain as emotionally laden as politics, this phe-
nomenon opens up the possibility that groups and indi-
viduals turn to ‘information bubbles’ in which they only
receive the information and discourses that strengthen
their own original prejudices. Along with this, the in-
corporation of new broadcasters generates an aggres-
sive competition in traditional media, thus fostering a
structural trend that stimulates whatever content that
captures people’s attention, meaning novel, spectacular,
conflicting and simple ones (Habermas, 2006). All of this
sets the ground for trivialising politics in a public sphere
where monologues, infotainment, post-truth and fake
news tend to prevail over more in-depth debates. Ignor-
ing these dynamics, Podemos entrusts the success of par-
ticipatory democracy to an informed and virtuous citizen
who has been largely disproven by empirical research.
However, the reform of liberal democracy does not
necessarily entail focusing on the aggregation of poorly
considered positions, but instead of developing institu-
tional innovations that can increase its deliberative qual-
ity (Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012). A deliberative en-
richment of liberal democracy is possible both at the
broad level of the public sphere (Fraser, 1990) and
also via minipublics such as citizen juries or delibera-
tive polls. These mechanisms could be strategically in-
troduced into the institutional design of representative
democracy to produce deliberative dynamics in differ-
ent stages of decision-making, or as a previous require-
ment for holding referendums or electing representa-
tives (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Gastil & Richards, 2013;
Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). For example, minipublics could
be used to deal with matters subject to strong parti-
san divides, such as the proposal for electoral reform
developed by the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly
in 2004 (Warren & Pearse, 2008). In addition, delibera-
tive polls could critically assess candidates and electoral
programmes as a mandatory requirement during elec-
toral campaigns, generating a deliberative impact in the
public opinion by receiving extensive media coverage
(Ackerman & Fishkin, 2002).
In short, instead of an expressive participation based
on aggregation, it is an enlightened participation that
should guide the reforms within liberal democracies to
address the political malaise at the beginning of the 21st
century. Even if a fully deliberative democracymay never
be achieved, well-designed institutions can increase the
deliberative quality of our political systems and, over
time, generate a more civic environment.
Acknowledgments
This research has been developed within the Project
‘Democracy and Political Participation: Towards a Redef-
inition of Democratic Citizenship’, funded by the Span-
ish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (DER2015-
66324-P).
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Ackerman, B., & Fishkin, J. (2002). Deliberation day. The
Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(2), 129–152.
Alameda, D., Galán, J., & Abad, J. M. (2018). La con-
sulta sobre el chalé de Iglesias yMontero bate récord
de votantes [The consultation on Iglesias and Mon-
teros’s country house breaks voter records]. El País.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 187–197 194
Retrieved fromhttps://elpais.com/politica/2018/05/
25/actualidad/1527247596_568134.html
Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Barber, B. (1984). Strong democracy. Participatory poli-
tics for a new age. Berkley, CA: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Bengtsson, A., & Christensen, H. (2014). Ideals and ac-
tions: Do citizens’ patterns of political participation
correspond to their conceptions of democracy? Gov-
ernment and Opposition, 51(2), 234–260.
Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Karp, J. (2007). Enraged or en-
gaged? Preferences for citizen participation in afflu-
ent democracies. Political Research Quarterly, 60(3),
351–362.
Budge, I. (1996). The new challenge of direct democracy.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W., & Stokes, D. (1980).
TheAmerican voter. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press.
Cohen, J. (1989). Deliberation and democratic legitimacy.
In A. Hamlin & P. Pettit (Eds.), The good polity (pp.
17–34). Oxford: Blackwell.
Constant, B. (1819). The liberty of ancients compared
with that of moderns. Retrieved from https://oll.
libertyfund.org/titles/2251
Converse, P. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass
publics. In D. Apter (Ed.),	Ideology and discontent (pp.
206–261). New York, NY: Free Press.	
Crozier, M.,	Huntington, S., &	Watanuki,	J.	(1975).	The
crisis of democracy. New York, NY: New York Univer-
sity Press.	
Dahl, R. (1989).Democracy and its critics. NewHaven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Dahl, R., & Tufte, E. (1973). Size and democracy. Red-
wood City, CA: Stanford University Press.
Della Porta, D., Fernández, J., Kouki, H., & Mosca, L.
(2017). Movement parties against austerity. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Díaz-Parra, I., & Jover-Báez, J. (2016). Social movements
in crisis? From the 15-M movement to the electoral
shift in Spain. International Journal of Sociology and
Social Policy, 36(9/10), 680–694.
Donovan, T., & Karp, J. (2006). Popular support for direct
democracy. Party Politics, 12(5), 671–688.
European Social Survey. (2013). Exploring public
attitudes, informing public policy. London: Euro-
pean Social Survey. Retrieved from https://www.
europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/findings/ESS1-3_
findings_booklet.pdf
Fishkin, J., & Luskin, R. (2005). Experimenting with a
democratic ideal: Deliberative polling and public
opinion. Acta Política, 40(3), 284–298.
Font, J., Galais, C., Wojcieszak, M., & Alarcón, P. (2014).
Citizens and participation. In J. Font, D. Della Porta,
& Y. Sintomer (Eds.),	Participatory democracy in
southern Europe (pp. 115–149). London: Roman &
Littlefield.	
Font, J., Wojcieszak, M., & Navarro, C. (2015). Partici-
pation, representation and expertise: Citizen prefer-
ences for political	decision-making processes. Politi-
cal Studies, 63(1), 153–172.
Fraser, N. (1990). Rethinking the public sphere: A contri-
bution to the critique of actually existing democracy.
Social Text, 1990(25/26), 56–80.
Ganuza, E., & Francés, F. (2012). The deliberative turn in
participation: The problem of inclusion and deliber-
ative opportunities in participatory budgeting. Euro-
pean Political Science Review, 4(2), 283–302.
Gastil, J., & Levine, P. (2005). The deliberative democracy
handbook. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.	
Gastil, J., & Richards, R. (2013). Making direct democracy
deliberative through random assemblies. Politics &
Society, 41(2), 253–281.
Goodin, R., & Dryzek, J. (2006). Deliberative impacts: The
macro-political uptake of mini-publics. Politics & So-
ciety, 34(2), 219–244.
Habermas, J. (1994). Three normative models of democ-
racy. Constellations, 1(1), 1–10.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between facts and norms. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Habermas, J. (2006). Political communication in me-
dia society: Does democracy still enjoy an epis-
temic dimension? The impact of normative theory
on empirical research. Communication Theory, 16(4),
411–426.
Haller, M. (2017). Direct democracy: Empowerment of
citizens or instrument of the elites? Corvinus Journal
of Sociology and Social Policy, 8(3), 55–83.
Held, D. (2006). Models of democracy (3rd ed.). Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.	
Hibbing, J., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2002). Stealth democ-
racy.	Americans’ beliefs in how government should
work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	
Hoffman, T. (1998). Rationality reconceived: The mass
electorate and democratic theory. Critical Review,
12(4), 459–480.
Howard, P., & Hussain, M. (2011). The role of digital me-
dia. Journal of Democracy, 22(3), 35–48.
Iglesias, P. (2015). Un nuevo compromiso histórico [A
new historic compromise]. El País. Retrieved from
https://elpais.com/elpais/2015/12/08/opinion/
1449598145_131940.html
Kioupkiolis, A. (2016). Podemos: The ambiguous
promises of left-wing populism in contemporary
Spain. Journal of Political Ideologies, 21(2), 99–120.
Latinobarómetro.	(2018). Informe 2018. Santiago de
Chile: Latinobarómetro. Retrieved from http://www.
latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
Lupia, A., & McCubbins, M. (1998). The democratic
dilemma. Can citizens learn what they need to know?
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Macpherson, C. B. (1977). The life and times of liberal
democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Madison, J., Hamilton, A., & Jay, J. (1987). The federalist
papers. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 187–197 195
Madrid City Council. (n.d.). Decide Madrid. Retrieved
from https://decide.madrid.es
Maeckelbergh, M. (2012). Horizontal democracy now:
From alterglobalization to occupation. Interface, 4(1),
207–234.
Manin, B. (1987). On legitimacy andpolitical deliberation.
Political Theory, 15(3), 338–368.
Manin, B. (1997). The principles of representative govern-
ment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Marangudakis,M. (2016). Visions of brotherhood. A com-
parative analysis of direct democracy in ancient and
modern Greece. Política y Sociedad, 53(3), 773–793.
Marcos, J. (2018). Podemos leaders win confidence
vote over country house scandal. El País. Re-
trieved from https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/28/
inenglish/1527492924_821506.html
Margetts, H. (2006). Cyber parties. In R. S. Katz &
W. Crotty (Eds.), Handbook of party politics (pp.
528–535). London: Sage Publications.
Matsusaka, J. (2005). The eclipse of legislatures: Di-
rect democracy in the 21st century. Public Choice,
124(1/2), 157–177.
Michels, R. (1959). Political parties. A sociological study
of the oligarchical tendencies ofmodern democracies.
New York, NY: Dover.
Mikola, B. (2017). Online primaries and intra-party
democracy: Candidate selection processes in Pode-
mos and the Five Star Movement. IDP: Revista de In-
ternet, Derecho y Politica, 2017(24), 37–49.
Montero, J. R., & Torcal, M. (Eds.). (2006). Political disaf-
fection in contemporary democracies: Social capital,
institutions and politics. London: Routledge.
Parkinson, J., & Mansbridge, J. (2012). Deliberative sys-
tems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory.
Cambridge: Cambridge University	Press.
Pérez Colomé, J., & Llaneras, K. (2017, February 28).
Qué tiene de bueno (y de malo) la consulta popular
de Madrid [What is good (and bad) in Madrid’s
popular consultation]. El País. Retrieved from
https://elpais.com/politica/2017/02/27/actualidad/
1488208630_865283.html
Pharr, S., & Putnam, R. (Eds.).	(2000). Disaf-
fected	democracies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Piña, R. (2018). Podemos pincha en las primarias para
Europa y Madrid: Sólo votan el 9,7% y el 11,8%
de los inscritos [Podemos fails in the European and
Madrid primaries: Turnout is only 9,7% and 11,8% of
those registered]. El Mundo. Retrieved from https://
www.elmundo.es/espana/2018/11/27/5bfd398b21
efa0cb7f8b45a7.html
Plaza Podemos.	(n.d.-a). ¿Cómo funciona la nueva Plaza
Podemos? [How does the new Podemos Square
work?]. Podemos Plaza. Retrieved from https://plaza.
podemos.info/how_it_works
Plaza Podemos.	(n.d.-b). Consultas ciudadanas [Citizen
consultations]. Podemos Plaza. Retrieved from
https://podemos.info/consultasciudadanas
Podemos.	(2014). Principios organizativos [Organiza-
tional principles].	Retrieved from https://euskadi.
podemos.info/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2016/
12/01_Principios_Organizativos.pdf
Podemos.	(2015). Queremos, sabemos, podemos. Un
programa para cambiar nuestro país [We want, we
know, we can. A program to change our country].
Madrid: Podemos. Retrieved from	http://servicios.
lasprovincias.es/documentos/Programa-electoral-
Podemos-20D-2015.pdf
Podemos.	(2017a). Documento organizativo [Organiza-
tional document]. Madrid: Podemos. Retrieved from
https://files.podemos.info/9AMl3us6iC.pdf
Podemos.	(2017b). Estatutos de Podemos [Statutes
of Podemos]. Madrid: Podemos. Retrieved from
https://files.podemos.info/XQpfxDwEvT.pdf
Podemos.	(2017c). Documento ético [Ethical docu-
ment].	Madrid: Podemos. Retrieved from https://
files.podemos.info/BL2bQhSWUv.pdf
Podemos. (2018). Reglamento de primarias para las
instituciones de representación [Rules for primary
elections to representative institutions]. Madrid:
Podemos. Retrieved from https://podemos.info/
wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Reglamento_
primarias_instituciones.pdf
Rico Motos, C. (2019). Enmienda antielitista: Crisis de
la representación y democracia radical [Anti-elitist
amendment: Crisis of representation and radical
democracy]. InM. Álvarez & J. Redondo (Eds.), Pode-
mos: Cuando lo nuevo se hace viejo [Podemos:
When what is new gets old] (pp. 157–182). Madrid:
Tecnos.
Rosenberg, S. (2007). Rethinking democratic delibera-
tion: The limits and potential of citizen participation.
Polity, 39(3), 335–360.
Rousseau, J. J. (1996). On the social contract. In D. Woot-
ton (Ed.),Modern political thought (pp. 464–534). In-
dianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Sampedro, V., & Lobera, J. (2014). The Spanish 15-M
movement: A consensual dissent? Journal of Spanish
Cultural Studies, 15(1/2), 61–80.
Sartori, G. (1987). The theory of democracy revisited.
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Schumpeter, J. (1976). Capitalism, socialism and democ-
racy. New York, NY: Harper and Row.
Shapiro, R. Y. (1998). Public opinion, elites, and democ-
racy. Critical Review, 12(4), 501–528.
Smith, G., &Wales, C. (2000). Citizens’ juries and deliber-
ative democracy. Political Studies, 48, 51–65.
Somin, I. (2010). Deliberative democracy and political ig-
norance. Critical Review, 22(2/3), 253–279.
Stefan, R., & Mounk, Y. (2016). The danger of decon-
solidation. The democratic disconnect. Journal of
Democracy, 27(3), 5–17.
Sunstein, C. (2002). The law of group polarization. The
Journal of Political Philosophy,	10(2), 175–195.	
Warren, M., & Pearse, H. (Eds.). (2008). Designing delib-
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 187–197 196
erative democracy. The British Columbia Citizens’ As-
sembly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Webb, P. (2013). Who is willing to participate? Dissatis-
fied democrats, stealth democrats and populists in
the United Kingdom. European Journal of Political Re-
search, 52(6), 747–772.
Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins ofmass opinion.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
About the Author
Carlos Rico Motos is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations in the Uni-
versidad Pontificia Comillas. His research focuses on the Theory of Democracy, civic education and
the models of representation, participation and political deliberation. His most relevant publications
in these areas include ‘The Controversy over Civic Education in Spain’ (European Political Science,
2010) and, more recently, Parliamentary Deliberation and Representative Democracy (Congreso de
los Diputados, 2016).
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 187–197 197
